Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 1
Number 1 Inaugural Issue

Article 13

1-1-1974

The Extent of the Border
Robert W. Sutis

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert W. Sutis, The Extent of the Border, 1 Hastings Const. L.Q. 235 (1974).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol1/iss1/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

THE EXTENT OF THE BORDER
By Robert W. Sutis*

Each year, hundreds of thousands of aliens enter the United
States illegally. In fiscal year 1972 alone, the Immigration and Naturalization Service located 398,000 such aliens.1

To curb this illegal

traffic, the federal government employs over 1,700 Border Patrol
agents, 1,400 of whom work at the southern border where the bulk

of the traffic takes place.2 But patrolling the country's borders is a dif-

ficult assignment.

Since canvassing of the 3,987 mile Canadian bor-

der and the 1,945 mile Mexican border is impossible solely from

permanent border stations, the government employs a variety of traffic
operations, and in some cases uses electronic monitoring in order to
curb the illegal entry of aliens.' Yet, even though the modest success of
the traffic operations has not been sufficient to meet the flood of illegal
alien traffic, the statute under which detection of alien traffic by traffic
networks was instituted, the Immigration and Nationality Acte (here-

inafter INA) was recently denied efficacy in most instances by
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. An examination of the holdings,
theories, and effects of this decision seems required.

Background
Before examining the case, one must first acknowledge the power
of the federal government to exclude aliens.' "Jurisdiction over its

own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent na* B.A., 1970, University of Illinois; J.D., 1974, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Brief for United States at 28, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973).
2. Id. at 22.
3. Id. at 26. The Border Patrol located 39,243 deportable aliens through alien
traffic checking operations in fiscal year 1972.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970).
5. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
6. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 97-99 (1903); Lem Moon Sing
v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.,
698, 711 (1893). See United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933).
[235]
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tion."'7 Indeed, "Lilt is necessarily exclusive and absolute."8
In attempting to detain illegal alien traffic, the federal government maintains checkpoint stations and "line watches"' along our borders, and thus manages to exercise at least a modicum of control over
the entry of illegal aliens and merchandise into the country. Case law

has recognized this activity to be a valid exercise of the government's
10
power.

In addition to such operations, the government conducts checkpoint searches at the functional equivalents of the border, those points
within the country which are analogous to points along the border.

Airports which receive non-stop flights originating from another country (for example Mexico City to Los Angeles flights), as well as
points where two or more roads leading from Mexico converge in the
United States fall under the definition of functional equivalents.
Searches at such points are also permissible."

Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires both a
showing of probable cause and a warrant from a neutral magistrate 2

before a search may be judged reasonable,' 3 border searches are well
recognized exceptions to these requirements.' 4 Whether conducted
along the border or at its functional equivalent, neither a warrant need
be secured nor probable cause shown in searches for illegal aliens or

merchandise.
However, the government also employs a system of roving border
patrols to conduct searches of automobiles and other vehicles at

points away from but near the border. Congress sanctioned this procedure under provisions of the INA

5

which permit officers of the

7. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
8. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
9. Line watches consist of surveillance along the international boundary line by
electronic monitoring and by Border Patrol officers on foot, in vehicles, or in observation aircraft.
10. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Henderson v. United
States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
11. Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970); Kelly v. United
States 197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952).
12. "Mhe right of the people to be secure in their persons ... and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
13. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-17 (1948).
14. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967) required no probable cause for ordinary search of one's clothing, a real suspicion for a strip search,
and full showing of probable cause for a body cavity search upon entry into the United
States.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970) provides: "Any officer or employee of the
Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have
power without warrant ... within a reasonable distance from any external boundary
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Immigration and Naturalization Service to search without warrant,
any vehicle for aliens16 within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States. The "reasonable distance" is loosely
defined to be within one hundred air miles from any external boundary
7

of the United States.1
The conflict that arises from roving border patrol searches should
be immediately observable: how may the rights of citizens, residents
and legally admitted -aliens be safeguarded against arbitrary and capricious searches of their vehicles at points within this one hundred

mile border zone?

Conversely, if such searches are not permissible

within Fourth Amendment requirements, how can the federal govern-

ment effectively combat the illegal entry of aliens in the United
States?

The issue, then, is "whether and under what circumstances

the Border Patrol may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in areas not far removed from the border for the purpose of
8
apprehending aliens illegally entering or in the country."1

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
The United States Supreme Court was afforded opportunity to
comment in the case of Almeida-Sanchei v. United States. 9 Almeida-Sanchez was a Mexican citizen holding a valid United States
work permit. His automobile was stopped twenty-five miles north of
the Mexican border on State Highway 78 in California. The road is
predominantly an east-west highway which nowhere reaches the
Mexican border. The United States Border Patrol, which stopped
Almeida-Sanchez' car, had no search warrant, nor any probable cause
to stop or search the car; 20 nonetheless, the marijuana they discovered
was used to convict him of illegally importing narcotics.2" Based
of the United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial
waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle, and
within a distance of twenty-five miles from any such external boundary to have access
to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent
the illegal entry of aliens into the United States... "
16. Id. This statute refers only to searches for aliens. Searches under customs
laws for illegal merchandise will be only tangentially considered in this article. See
text accompanying note 68 infra.
17. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (1973) provides: "Reasonable distance. The term
'reasonable distance', as used in the Immigration and Nationality Act, means within
100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States or any shorter distance
which may be fixed by the district director, or, so far as the power to board and search
aircraft is concerned, any distance fixed pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section."
18. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 276 (1973).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 268.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1970).
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on section 1357 (a) (3) of the INA and the regulations thereunder,22
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the search,23 and denied
Almeida-Sanchez' claim that the warrantless search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence should have
been excluded. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that since probable cause was lacking the search could not be justified on the basis
of any special rules applicable to automobile searches; that it could
not be justified by analogy to administrative inspections as there was
no warrant, probable cause, or consent; and that the search was not a
border search or a search conducted at a functional equivalent of the
border.
The majority24 opinion, emphasizing that the right of the individual under the Fourth Amendment is paramount, 2 required an affirmative answer to one of four questions before the Almeida-Sanchez
search could be held valid.
Was the search conducted at a border point or functional equivalent thereof? Only then could the case come within the border
search exception to warrant and probable cause requirements under
the Fourth Amendment. The Border Partol would have had to intercept the vehicle crossing some point along one of the externa
boundaries of the United States or along some constructive border
point-a functional equivalent 26 The Court restricted the operation
of INA to the functional equivalents of the borders.27
Was the search conducted with the consent of the parties to the
search? Consent may preclude the finding of an unconstitutional
search if the consent is freely given,28 since the person consenting
waives his objection to a search that might not otherwise be reasonable. The issue generally is whether the person searched freely and
voluntarily gave his consent or whether he peacefully submitted to
the pressure and force of the investigating officer.2 9
Was the search conducted pursuant to a valid warrant? In order
to obtain a valid search warrant the investigating officer must compile
a set of facts which when presented to the issuing magistrate represent
probable cause, 0 generally defined to exist "where the facts and cir22. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1973).
23. 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971).
24. 413 U.S. 266 (1973) Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart comprised the majority. Justice Powell concurred in a separate opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented.
25. Id. at 273.
26. Id. at 272.
27. Id. at 272-75.
28. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
29. Id. at 222; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
30. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925). For requirements as to par-

Spring 19741

BORDER SEARCHES

cumstances are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been or is being committed..",
Finally, was the search conducted without a warrant but within
an exception to the warrant requirement? The Court admits that is
well "settled that a stop and search of a moving automobile can be

made without a warrant.""2 However this exception to the warrant requirement is a narrow one. While the Court in Carroll v. United
States33 recognized that a moving automobile presents a situation

"where it is not practicable -to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought,"34 a full showing of probable cause is required to validate a search of the vehicle under the standard of reasonableness.3 5
Answering all four inquiries in the negative, the Court struck
down the search and excluded the evidence. 30 Absent interception of

aliens crossing at some border point or functional equivalent, a search
for aliens may be conducted by the Border Patrol only with consent,
with a warrant, or upon a full showing of probable cause to support a
warrant under the Carroll37 doctrine.

The majority opinion written by Justice Stewart, is certainly the
most predictable when traditional legal principles are applied to the
facts of Almeida-Sanchez. It applies well-documented and supported

legal theory to the case in reaching a sound conclusion that, above all,
ticularity, see Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) and as
to issuance by a neutral magistrate, see Cooledge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971).
31. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
32. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973).
33. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
34. Id. at 153.
35. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Regarding full warrantless
searches of the person incident to custodial arrest for traffic offenses, see Gustafson
v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973) and United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
The effects of these two recent decisions do not bear significantly upon this paper.
Section 1357(a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is expressly confined to
searches of vessels, vehicles, aircraft and the like: the Robinson and Gustafson opinions
are expressly limited to searches of persons. While the cases may prognosticate an
extension to the full warrantless search of vehicles, they are for now limited to searches
of persons.
36. See text following note 25 supra. The evidence was excluded on the force
of the exclusionary rule, which denies admissibility to unconstitutionally acquired evidence. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). However, it should be noted
that the continued viability of this doctrine is open to some doubt. United States v.
Calandra, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974); Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973); United
States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
37. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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safeguards the rights of the indivdual under the Fourth Amendment
by narrowly construing the function of the Border Patrol under section
1357 (a) (3) of the INA.
However, consonant with the rule that the Court will hold as
narrowly as possible under the facts presented to it,3 1 the Court glosses
over the larger problem in Almeida-Sanchez. The opinion fails to
offer any useful solution to the problem of aliens illegally entering
the country at innumerable points along the border where the government is tactically unable to police their entry. The opinion ignores
the possibility of alternative schema for such utilization of the Border
Patrol that would satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
and still provide a practical means for effectively curtailing the illegal
entry of aliens into the country. The Court offers no substitute after
dramatically curtailing the usefulness of the Border Patrol by severely
restricting its area of operation. The effect, then, is a void in the
ability of the federal government to prevent illegal entry of aliens.
Dissenting Opinion
An examination of the dissenting opinion,3 9 which would uphold the
search and admit the evidence derived from it, is necessary to an
understanding of the theme of this note. The dissent holds that the
considered judgment of Congress is controlling in the implementation
of standards for vehicular searches by the Border Patrol for illegal
aliens at points away from the border; 40 that the enactment of section
1357 (a) (3) of the INA is a legitimate exercise of congressional power;41 and that searches incident to the statute are valid subject only
to the proviso that the statute "be exercised in a manner consistent
with the standards of reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment."4 2
Despite the apparent logic of the position, grave dangers in the opinion's application become apparent upon closer examination.
The Fourth Amendment imposes the standard of reasonableness
upon constitutional searches. This standard is multi-faceted,43 but
38. See German Alliance Insurance Company v. Home Water Supply, 226 U.S.
220 (1912); American Book Company v. Kansas, 193 U.S. 49 (1904).
39. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun
and Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
40. Id. at 292.
41. Id. at 293.
42. Id. at 297.
43. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent searches);
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stops, frisks
and detentions); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (vehicle searches); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (regulatory searches).
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generally requires a warrant issued by a magistrate upon probable
cause. The dissenting opinion, stressing that border searches are an
exception to the Fourth Amendment strictures, views the border not
merely as a jagged line that separates the United States from Mexico
and Canada, but rather as a zone that stretches out from the border
into the interior of the United States.44 Justice White finds this
penumbra concept necessary and justified because: (1) Congress enacted the statute in order to inhibit the free flow of aliens illegally
entering the country 45 and (2) the considered judgments of the
courts of appeal most closely associated with the issues, the Fifth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, have approved the statute. 4 6 His opinion
would give the Border Patrol complete license to search for aliens
within this gray zone, limiting only the extent of such searches; the
scope of a valid search would be circumscribed by the bounds of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 47 This reasonableness
would appear to be reasonable cause to suspect that the vehicle
searched carried illegal aliens, 48 and would thus be synonymous with
that traditionally required of searches conducted at the border or at
functional equivalents.4 9
Looking to the case law under INA which the dissent cites with
approval, the grave consequences of their position becomes apparent.
Two elements are essential to note in consideration of the cases: (1)
those persons' vehicles that may be subjected to search, and (2) the
scope of permissible searches.
Under the dissent's opinion, any vehicle passing through a permanent or temporary checkpoint may be subjected to at least a cursory search. The government asserts that selection of those vehicles
to be searched is based on "the number of persons in the vehicle,
the way the car is riding (for example, low in the rear), the size of the
vehicle (for example, pick-up truck or van), and the apparent nationality of the occupants,"5 0 and cites United States v. McDaniel,51 to
illustrate that any person's vehicle is subject to search at checkpoint
stations.
44. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 294 (1973). See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
45. Id. at 292.
46. Id. at 295. See Note, Border Search in the Ninth Circuit: Almeida-Sanchez
-A Borderline Decision, 23 HAsTwGS L.J. 1309 (1972) for a discussion of the Ninth
Circuit approach to Almeida-Sanchez.
47. 413 U.S. at 297.
48. Id. at 294, 297.
49. Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
50. Brief for United States at 24 n.20, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973) (emphasis added).
51. 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972).
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The defendants in McDaniel were stopped at a permanent checkpoint about eight miles north of the Mexican border. Having determined that McDaniel -and his companions were United States
citizens,
the agent had the defendants open the trunk of their car. The agent
observed that one of the defendants 'was nervous and overly talkative
while the other was silent. When the agent opened the trunk, he
spotted four large burlap bags partially covered with a Mexican newspaper. Defendant McDaniel responded that the bags contained alfalfa. The agent requested McDaniel to open the bags, discovered
they contained marijuana, and arrested the defendants for violation of
narcotics law. The evidence was admitted under the rationale that
the car was reasonably stopped and the trunk opened pursuant to an
authorized border search for aliens, and -that the burlap bags were
opened under the authority of a search for illegal merchandise granted
by custom laws.5 2
McDaniel involved a search conducted at a permanent checkpoint station. However, under the auspices of section 1357 (a) (3)
of the INA, the dissenters in tlmeida-Sanchez would apply identical
standards .to roving searches conducted within the one hundred mile
border zone. 3
The dissent cites with approval Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 4
in which two inspectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service were maintaining traffic surveillance on a through highway in
Truth or Consequences, New Mexico, ninety miles north of the
Mexican border. Defendants Rodriquez, a United States citizen, and
Venega, a Mexican national holding a valid nonresident alien border
crossing card, were traveling north in a car bearing Arizona license
plates. "There was no suspicious conduct by the occupants of the
car . . . and there was no hot pursuit from the border." 55 The immigration officers "had no reason to stop the car except for their observation of the occupants and the license plates." 50
The court held that the stop of the car and search of the trunk
7
for aliens were proper.5
Thus, under the dissent's opinion, untold numbers of persons would
be subject to detention by the Border Patrol and at least cursory searches
anywhere within one hundred miles of the border Any Chicano, for
52. Id. at 133-134.
53. 413 U.S. 266, 298 (1973).
54. 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969).
55. Id. at 1208.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1209, the court excluded the evidence of heroin upon subsequent search
in the pockets of a jacket located in the trunk as outside the scope of a search for
aliens.

Spring 1974]

BORDER SEARCHES

instance, travelling in the evening in a southern border state other than
where his car is registered would be legally obligated to stop and submit
to a search of his car. It is doubtful that the framers of the Fourth

Amendent intended such a consequence.5 8 It is clearly unreasonable that
anyone's vehicle might be searched without warrant simply because it
lies within one hundred miles of the border. The need of the govern-

ment to search and the right of the individual to travel freely must be
balanced before reaching such a result.

Extrapolating further, if the Rodriquez case holds and the government admits59 that the nationality of the passengers of a vehicle is a
primary element in the agent's decision to stop and search a vehicle
near the southern border, what then is the basis for patrolling the
northern border states? What vision springs up in the minds of the
Border Patrol to allow the agents to distinguish out-of-state travellers
from Canadians illegally entering the country? What test exists for
distinguishing a resident of Vancouver or Montreal from a citizen of
Seattle or New York City?

What basis exists to allow de facto dis-

crimination against Chicanos in the southern border states? Is the disproportionate number of aliens crossing the southern border as opposed to the northern border sufficient justification? Does this really
satisfy the strict test under the Fifth Amendment due process clause 6°
which arises when the fundamental interest is the right to freedom
from unreasonable searches and the suspect classification is race? 61
An examination of the extent of permissible searches approved
by case law, moreover, amplifies the importance of rejecting the dis4
senting opinion. Clearly -the hood,62 trunk's and the backseat of
vehicles are within the purview of the search as they are considered
compartments where aliens could hide. The issue then becomes to
what extent these areas may be searched. A search purely for aliens
58. Compare James Madison's instruction that "independent tribunals of justice
. . . be led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
Constitution by the declaration of rights" I Annals of Cong. 439 (1789), with the recent broad definition of privacy in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
59. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
60. U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. .. "
61. Shapiro v. Thompson ,394 U.S. 618 (1969) requires generally the application
of the strict scrutiny test when fundamental liberties are infringed. The right of privacy is a fundamental liberty: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1.13 (1973); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The rigid scrutiny test is imposed upon statutes which
discriminate on the basis of race: Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
62. Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1963).
63. Fumigalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 1970).
64. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 286 (1973).
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would ,appear to stop at a cursory inspection of the compartments under the Border Patrol agent's role as immigration officer.65 However, the Border Patrol agent also wears the hat of the customs of-

ficer6" which he may don at any time, 67 greatly expanding his powers.
By statute, 68 a customs officer may search any vehicle or person69

he suspects of possessing illegal merchandise, or any trunk or envelope
which he has reasonable cause to suspect of containing illegal merchandise. The meaning of this authority in conjunction with the
agent's power as an immigration officer has been illustrated in United
States v. McDanie70 and is further delineated in United States v.
71
DeLeon.
In United States v. DeLeon, defendant's car was stopped at a
checkpoint ten miles north of the Mexican border. To facilitate a
search for aliens, defendant was requested to open his trunk. He did
so and the officer discovered a false bottom. The agent punched a

small hole in the false bottom and "detected what he thought to be
the smell of marihuana. Opening the false bottom, the agent found
three one-pound packages of heroin and a pistol; '7 2 this evidence was

admitted at trial to support the indictment for possession and illegal
importation of heroin. A false bottom on a car near the border and
the agent's awareness of narcotics smuggling in the area was sufficient
cause to "suspect" that the vehicle contained illegal narcotics and sub78

sequently to search for them.

65. United States v. DeLeon, 462 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1972).
66. Id.
67. United States v. MeDaniels, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972).
68. 19 U.S.C. 482 (1970) provides: "Search of vehicles and persons. Any of the
officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, search, and examine,
as" well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, beast, or person, on
which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty,
or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law,
whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast,
or otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may
have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which v as imported contrary
to law; and if any such officer or other person so authorized shall find any merchandise on or about any such vehicle, beast, or person, or in any such trunk or envelope,
which he shall have reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty, or to have been
unlawfully introduced into the United States, whether by the person in possession or
charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle beast, or otherwise, he shall seize and secure
the same for trial."
69. See Note, Search and Seizure at the Border-the Border Search, 21 RtuTGERS
L. Ruv. 513 (1967) (discussion of Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir.
1966) involving the use of rectal probe, saline solution and polyethylene tubes to facilitate search for narcotics).
70. 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972).
71. 462 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1972).
72. Id. at 171.
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The agent wearing the two hats of the immigration and the ous-

toms officer clearly has extensive power subject only to his discretion
and judgment. The interposition of a neutral magistrate between his
decision to search and his actions in the field, so central to the concept
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, 74 is absent in this situation.
According to the dissenting opinion in Almeida-Sanche 75 then,

the Border Patrol would be permitted to stop almost any vehicle76 within

one hundred miles of the border, on the authority of a routine check
for aliens. 7 7 Once the car is stopped, a search for aliens involving
opening the hood, 7S the trunk" and inspection of the backseat of the
car might be conducted. 80 Any suspicious object in these compart-

ments would then be subject to a more thorough search either upon
a showing of probable cause to arrest"' or upon a mere "reasonable
suspicion" of violation of custom laws.8 2 These grave infringements
upon individual freedom approach the severity of general warrants in
the discretion of the investigating officer long held to be abhorrent to
our system."3 It is questionable whether such a license in the hands
of the Border Patrol is desirable or necessary to carry out the government's interest in stopping of illegal entry of aliens.

Concurring Opinion
Justice Powell's concurring opinion provides possible relief from

the harsh effects upon individual freedoms under the dissent's opinion
and from the inability of a government to effectively control illegal
alien traffic under the majority's opinion. 4
In Almeida-Sanchez, the search was not conducted pursuant to
73. Id.
74. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
75. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
76. Compare Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970) with
Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969).
77. United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1972).
78. Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1963).
79. Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 1970).
80. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 286 (1973).
81. Chimelv. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
82. United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 133 (5th Cir. 1972). See also
,note 69 infra containing text of 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
83. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192 (1927).
84. A majority of the Court would agree with Justice Powell's approach. All four
dissenting Justices seem to approve it. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 288-89 (1973). The Justices in the majority are split. Id. at 270, n.3.
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any warrant nor was there any probable cause to search. 8 5 Justice
Powell points out that except in certain limited circumstances s6 both
probable cause and a warrant are required to satisfy the Fourth
Amendments proscription against "unreasonable searches and seizures." Since the case fell within none of the established warrant and
probable cause exceptions, none of the prior decisions of the Supreme
Court would support the search in Almeida-Sanchez. Justice Powell
agrees, therefore, with the majority that the search was illegal and the
87
evidence inadmissable.
The importance of the Powell opinion is not his holding on the
facts of Almeida-Sanchez but the alternative he presents, a proposal
for utilization of a roving Border Patrol to control illegal alien traffic. He maintains that sufficient probable cause might exist and that
a warrant procedure is available under accepted standards that would
allow the Border Patrol to carry out vehicular searches for aliens in
the future.
Probable Cause
Justice Powell admits that probable cause in the sense of specific
knowledge on the part of the goverment concerning a particular automobile or its passengers is lacking in all but rare cases.88 However,
he finds an operational equivalent of probable cause that would be
sufficient under the Fourth Amendment to jusify area searches by
the Border Patrol.89 Justice Powell's proposal is not novel, but rather
is borrowed from the probable cause requirement in the context of
searches to identify housing code violations, with an analogy to the
landmark case concerning housing code violation inspections, Camara
v. Municipal Court.90 Rather than requiring specific knowledge that
a particular home contained housing code violations, the Court there
permitted general knowledge, an "appraisal of conditions in the area
as a whole"9 '- to satisfy the requirement of probable cause.
Similar considerations to those which allowed the Court in Camara
to after the traditional standard of probable cause also exist in the
case of roving B6rder Patrol searches.9 2 First, both area code
85. Id. at 268.
86. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973). See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
87. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275-276 (1973).
88. Id. at 276.
89. Id. at 279.
90. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
91. Id. at 536.
92. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 278-279 (1973).
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enforcement inspections 93 and roving border region searches 94 have
received judicial approval. Secondly, the searches would only be conducted in areas where the concentration of illegal alien traffic or code
violations was high or likely.95 In addition, "it is doubtful that any
other canvassing technique would acheive acceptable results"9 for
code inspections, and probably for alien searches. Of added significance to the possibility of probable cause in area searches for aliens is
the fact that the judiciary has established that a search of one's car is
far less intrusive on Fourth Amendment rights than a search of one's
home.97 Thus, if the balancing of the extent of invasion versus the
purpose for the search indicates that probable cause based on general
knowledge of the area satisfies the strictures of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment in regard to search of homes for code violations, 98 so too should vehicle searches for aliens be permitted when the
same balance of interests exists.
Justice Powell suggests four factors which would be relevant in
determining whether probable cause existed for the Border Patrol to
search the area in question:
(i) flThe frequency with which aliens illegally in the country
are known or reasonably believed to be transported within a particular area; (ii) the proximity of the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of the
area, including the roads therein and the extent of their use, and
(iv) the probable degree of interference with the nights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope of the proposed search,
it's duration, and the concentration of illegal alien traffic in relation to the general traffic of the road or area.99
The opinion points out, however, that mere probable cause alone
could not justify a search of vehicles by the Border Patrol.10 0
WarrantProcedure
The Court has long held that a search of private property without
proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a
93. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367-71 (1959), but note that the case
was expressly overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) to
the extent it provided for warrantless searches.
94. See, e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970); Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 410
F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969).
95. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536, 538 (1967).
96. Id. at 537.
97. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
98. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-38 (1967).
99. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283-284 (1973).
100. Id. at 282.
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valid search warrant. 10 1 To overcome this requirement, it must be
demonstrated that the search falls within certain limited exceptions.
Justice Powelrs concurring opinion indicates again that none of
the major exceptions is applicable here. 10 2 Area searches do not fall
within the warrantless "pat down" for weapons in Terry v. Ohio,103
because there is no reasonable belief that criminal conduct has or is
taking place and that the passenger of the car is armed and dangerous
to the patrol officer or to others nearby. Clearly inapplicable are the
congressionally authorized warrantless searches of federally regulated
businesses where the dealer accepts this inspection as a burden of doing
business. 10 Also inapplicable are the automobile search cases, where
the warrantless search of the vehicle must be supported by probable
cause arising fom specific knowledge about the automobile searched;"0 5
otherwise, the exception based on the mobility of the car would not
06
apply.3
The necessity for a warrant to satisfy the Fourth Amendment is
analogous to the warrant requirement enunciated in Camara07 and
See v. City of Seattle. 0 8 Camara points out that the test of whether
a warrant is necessary for such searches is "whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search."' 0 9 No such frustration need arise in roving searches
for aliens. Inconvenience alone does not justify a warrantless search. 1 0
"According to the government, the incidence of illegal transportation
of aliens on certain roads is predictable, and the roving searches are
apparently planned in advance or carried out according to a predetermined schedule.""'
The requirement of a warrant brings with it a crucial safeguard
against overreaching governmental action. By requiring a warrant,
there is interposed between the governmental official and the individual an issuing magistrate who determines when, where, how long, and
to what extent searches may be conducted. His presence becomes
101. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925) requires that a warrant be secured for search of a car if at all reasonably practicable.
102. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 282 (1973).
103. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
104. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (sale of guns); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (sale of liquor).
105. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
106. Id.
107. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
108. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
109. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
110. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972).
111. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283 (1973).
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the essence of the standard of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, because he determines whether searches may be initiated and
if such searches are to continue. The power to balance the need of
the government to search and the right of the individual to resist that
search rests upon the magistrate as a neutral arm of the government.
This fundamental realization makes the requirement of a warrant es'sential except in rare instances.
Effects
The Powell opinion thus fills the void left by the majority opinion,
and yet safeguards the rights of individuals which would be left in
doubt by the dissenting opinion. The approach provides for a warrant
system with a neutral magistrate authorizing roving border patrol
searches only upon a showing of probable cause, involving a consideration of the degree of incidence of alien traffic in the area to be
searched. 112 Such a requirement protects the rights of individuals
from searches in most areas and yet allows the government to carry
out its responsibility by authorizing limited searches of vehicles in
areas where illegal alien traffic is prevalent. Secondly, the magistrate
would consider the proximity of the area to the border, 113 presumably
requiring a greater showing of cause as the distance from the border
increased. This effectively balances the government's interest in apprehending illegal aliens at or near the border with the right of the
individual to be more protected as he moves more comfortably into
the country. Thirdly, the magistrate would examine the topography
of the area with an eye to its size and value for alien traffic along with
its road system and use.1 14 This condition limits the scope of the
search significantly by restricting the execution of the warrant to a
particular site or perhaps even to a particular section of a road or
highway. Finally, the magistrate must consider the possible interference with individual rights when the search is viewed as a whole."'
This important safeguard includes inspection of the number of people
who might be searched, the probability of apprehending aliens, and
duration of the search. The issuing magistrate could deny warrants
where the real objective is the apprehension of narcotics law violators,
where the executing officer could not set forth sufficient probable
cause to obtain a warrant on the narcotics charge itself.
Since most of the cases arising under the Border Patrol's search
for aliens resulted in prosecutions for violations of narcotics laws, the
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 283-84. Id.
Id. at 284.
Id.
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opinion may work a hardship on the government's attempted elimination of narcotics smuggling." 6 Indeed, the serious drug problem in
the country may have been the unstated motivation behind the dissenters' decision to uphold the extensive powers of the Border Patrol
under their interpretation of the statute at issue in Almeida-Sanchez. 1T7
Whatever effect the Powell opinion may have on the Border Patrol's
role as customs officer, the opinion would appear to suggest an effective method for the government to employ in curbing illegal alien
traffic. Only if issuing magistrates, because of carelessness or lack of
responsibility, allow the issuance of warrants to become a rubber
stamp procedure may those lawfully within the country suffer any infringement on their rights of privacy. Fraudulent and exhaustive
searches of vehicles will be conducted only if the magistrates repeatedly
issue warrants realizing that the sole reason behind and result of the
warrant is apprehension of narcotics law violators. The random,
intrusive searches permitted at the discretion of the Border Patrol
agent would be eliminated and the number of exhaustive stops and
searches for narcotics under the guise of searches for aliens would be
curtailed.
In sum, the Powell opinion is a common sense, pragmatic approach. It applies accepted legal opinion to novel problems in order
to arrive at a tailored and practical solution. Specifically, the opinion
presents a workable means for the apprehension of illegal aliens that
would not significantly interfere with those individual rights of privacy that are so central to the concept of liberty.
116. Any hardship worked by this opinion should be more than off-set by the recent cases of United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973); and Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973) where extensive power for searches of persons was recently
granted.
117. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).

